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Women and the Free Exercise Clause:
Some Thoughts About a (Religious) Feminist Reading
Marie A. Failinger*
Among the dozens of Supreme Court cases on the free exercise of
religion, women play a mostly invisible part. We know of Adell Sherbert1
and Frieda Yoder;2 and less famously, Alma Lovell,3 Lillian Gobitis,4 Paula
Hobbie,5 Sarah Prince,6 and Lucie McClure.7 We know that these women
go out into the streets to tell the Good News, refuse to salute idols, refuse to
work on the Sabbath, and refuse to go to school in violation of their
religion. But, we do not hear their voices very loudly.
At the same time, until recently, we have consistently heard only one
woman’s voice among the United States Supreme Court Justices who
propound on what the Free Exercise Clause, and related statutes,8 require
from the states in the protection of religious freedom. Justice O’Connor, the
woman who served longest on the Court, has certainly made her mark on
Religion Clause jurisprudence, though primarily in the Establishment
Clause area—one powerful exception is her concurrence in Employment
Division v. Smith.9 Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Ginsburg, coming more
recently to the religious freedom conversation, have also contributed
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Professor of Law, Mitchell Hamline School of Law and former Editor-in-Chief of the Journal
of Law and Religion.
1
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
2
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
3
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
4
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
5
Hobbie v. Unemp’t Comp. Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
6
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
7
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Cheryl Perich, at the center of one of the
most recent important Free Exercise cases, was not making a Free Exercise claim. Rather, she was
arguing, with the EEOC, that Hosanna Tabor Lutheran Church and School could not make the Free
Exercise argument that, since she was a “minister,” the court did not have jurisdiction to hear her
Americans with Disabilities Act claim. Siding with the Church, the Supreme Court recognized the
existence of a “ministerial exception” under the Free Exercise Clause for disability discrimination
claims, and held that under the church’s teachings, her position fell within that exception. See HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). For more on the
theological complexity of this conflict, see Marie A. Failinger, Lutheran and Yet Not Lutheran: A
Church School Tests the Dilemma of Church and State, LXXXV THE CRESSET 19 (2012).
8
Congress has supplemented the Free Exercise Clause with religious freedom protections in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2001), and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000c-5 (2000).
9
494 U.S. 872, 906 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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See discussion infra notes 103–16.
I borrow the term “particularist” from Ayelet Shachar, who in Multicultural Jurisdictions used
the term “religious particularist” to refer to a sovereignty model in which religious communities would
be delegated jurisdiction over certain matters, usually in family law. AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS 72–78 (2001).
11
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important insights, again primarily in non-Free Exercise cases,10 but how
these newer Justices will shape their own Free Exercise jurisprudence is not
as clear.
Yet, even in the early stages of jurisprudential development for these
Justices, it might be helpful to ask whether we are hearing “a woman’s
voice” in either the litigants before the Court or the women Justices who
write opinions about these cases. And, we might wonder whether there are
distinct themes that might characterize a “woman’s voice.” As we move
into theory, I will suggest that there may even be a religious feminist voice
that provides a set of values that would help us fruitfully explicate the Free
Exercise Clause. It goes without saying that talking of a “woman’s” or
“feminist” voice, or even a “religious feminist” voice, already essentializes
a luxurious diversity of women’s voices and opinions about the troubling
issues that confront judges attempting to find a faithful reading of the Free
Exercise Clause. Nevertheless, I believe that not exploring what such a
voice might sound like risks too easy acceptance of the existing readings of
Free Exercise. They have been largely constructed from a secular
imagination, and by male judges and male litigants, about what is at stake in
Free Exercise jurisprudence. Therefore, they do not represent the important
diversity of expression about how robust Free Exercise protection might
contribute to the flourishing of a pluralistic, but flawed, democratic culture.
In speaking of a religious feminist voice, I would make an initial
response to the likely critique that a religious feminist voice is too
particularist, to borrow Professor Shachar’s term, because it fails to
embrace the experience and commitments of secular feminists and
secularists as a whole.11 If secular feminists cannot (or choose not to)
experience the Divine, whom many religious feminists argue is at the center
of their lives, perhaps a religious feminist reading of the “secular”
Constitution is more than just problematical on Establishment Clause
grounds. One might argue that following such a voice not only excludes
half of humanity, but ignores the ethical and philosophical voices of many
women over the centuries who do not profess a religious commitment as
well.
There are at least three kinds of responses to this concern, none of
them “sure winners” foreclosing all debate about whether a religious
feminist reading is valuable or defensible. All of these responses, however,
are strong enough to justify at least an initial exploration of religious
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feminist themes. First, even if it were true that religious feminism has
distinctive understandings and commitments that exclude those of secular
feminists, to embrace secular feminist arguments as the “default” feminist
approach also excludes important voices in a powerful way. Most of the
world’s women are still religious,12 and their experience must be accounted
for, if any jurisprudence is to embrace women’s real experiences and
challenges.
Second, theologies that embrace natural law theory, such as the three
western monotheistic traditions (Islam, Judaism, and Christianity), would
argue that the moral commitments religious feminism proposes can be
tested by all people, regardless of their faith commitments, through reason
and experience.13 Theologically, they would argue that God the Creator has
“written on our hearts,” imprinted on us from the moment of our creation,
the ethical values and demands that God makes of us for life in this world.14
In these traditions, even the atheist who rejects the existence of God is
already infused with the knowledge of right and wrong, and the innate
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12
For information on current religious affiliations in the world, see, for example, Pew Forum on
Religion & Public Life, The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010–2050:
Why Muslims Are Rising Fastest and the Unaffiliated Are Shrinking as a Share of the World’s
Population (Apr. 2, 2015), www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projections-2010-2050 (noting that
while the worldwide religiously unaffiliated population is expected to grow in absolute numbers from 1.
1 billion to 1.2 billion from 2010–2050, its percentage of the population is projected to decline from
sixteen percent to thirteen percent). In the United States, women claim to be more religious as a group
than men. See Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, America’s Changing Religious Landscape:
Christians Decline Sharply as Share of Population; Unaffiliated and Other Faiths Continue to Grow
(May 12, 2015), www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape (noting the fact
that while the percentage of American women who describe themselves as religiously unaffiliated is
growing at the same rate of men, only nineteen percent claim to be religiously unaffiliated as compared
with twenty-seven percent of men who describe themselves that way).
13
For samples of natural law arguments from Christianity, Islam, and Judaism that all persons
can discover moral truths through reason, see, for example, JOHANNES HECKEL, A JURISTIC
DISQUISITION ON LAW IN THE THEOLOGY OF MARTIN LUTHER 55–56 (2010) (noting that God’s mercy
“left man an inborn notion of what is law . . . . This is natural man’s divine ‘dowry’ which makes him
aware of what is right and moral . . . .”); Anver Emon, Natural Law and Natural Rights in Islamic Law,
20 J.L. & RELIGION, 351, 359, 362 (2004–05) (noting that the Mu’tazilite school held that “one can
move from empirical investigations of benefits and harms to a determination of divine obligation” and
that “[t]he capacity to make moral judgments is a natural endowment of human beings, or what alJuwayni called the haqq al-adamiyyin”); Nahum Rakover, Jewish Law and the Noahide Obligation to
Preserve Social Order, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1073 (1991) (explaining how the Noahide laws govern all
of humanity and how five of those commandments—namely, “theft, sexual offenses, idolatry,
blasphemy, and bloodshed” are discoverable by logic and rational reasoning).
14
Romans 2:15 (ISV) (“They show that what the Law requires is written in their hearts, a fact to
which their own consciences testify, and their thoughts will either accuse or excuse them.”); see also
Peter Judson Richards, The Law “Written in Their Hearts”?: Rutherford and Locke on Nature,
Government and Resistance, 18 J.L. & RELIGION 151, 169 (2002–03) (quoting JOHN RUTHERFORD,
LEX, REX, OR THE LAW AND THE PRINCE (1982) (noting that “even ‘heathens have, by instinct of nature,
both made laws morally good, submitted to them, and set kings and judges over them, which clearly
proveth that men have an active power of government by nature’”).
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ability to understand how he or she must live with his or her neighbor.15
Finally, in the spirit of Rawls’ “overlapping consensus” theory,16 if we
discover that religious feminism shares common cause with the arguments
of secular feminism, the provenance or origins of those values should not
cast suspicion over their validity; these are claims that can be embraced as
consonant with the secular jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause.
I. WHAT WOULD CHARACTERIZE A RELIGIOUS FEMINIST’S
READING OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE?
Philosophical roadmaps attempting to describe the “different voice”
spoken by women, particularly feminists, have highlighted important
contrasting themes in traditional (sometimes called “patriarchal”) versus
feminist approaches to difficult ethical or jurisprudential choices. Among
these values has been the feminist emphasis on inclusivity and embrace of
difference as a challenge to patriarchal ethical or legal systems that exclude
groups from political and social participation or respect because of their
innate differences or their religious or philosophical dissent from
majoritarian culture or values.17 A second value is contextualism: feminists
emphasize that ethical and legal judgments should be made in full
awareness and embrace of the context of cases.18 They have largely rejected
mechanical application of abstract rules to situations that are roughly
equivalent in order to achieve justice, an approach which prioritizes
regularity, predictability, and equal treatment. One specific contextual

04/28/2016 10:11:02
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15
See, e.g., George W. Forell, Is There Lutheran Ethical Discourse?, 15 WORD AND WORLD, no.
1, 1994–95, at 4 (noting that atheists and non-Christians have God’s law written on their hearts and may
cooperate in achieving the common good on this earth).
16
See, e.g., John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 233, 235–36 (1989). Rawls notes “the fact that a diversity of comprehensive doctrines is a
permanent feature of a society with free institutions, and that this diversity can be overcome only by the
oppressive use of state power—calls for explanation.” Of course, in justifying the use of overlapping
consensus, Rawls assumes that “reasonable disagreement is disagreement between reasonable persons,
that is, between persons who have realized their two moral powers to a degree sufficient to be free and
equal citizens in a democratic regime, and who have an enduring desire to be fully cooperating members
of society over a complete life. We assume such persons share a common human reason, similar powers
of thought and judgment, a capacity to draw inferences and to weigh evidence and to balance competing
considerations, and the like.” Id. While some would argue that religious claims do not meet such criteria,
most mainstream religionists would disagree.
17
CHERYL PRESTON, DECONSTRUCTING EQUALITY IN RELIGION, FEMINISM, LAW, AND
RELIGION 27 (Marie A. Failinger, Elizabeth R. Schiltz & Susan J. Stabile eds., 2014); see generally
NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: A PRIMER 10, 12 (2006).
18
See LEVIT AND VERCHICK, supra note 17, at 13 (noting that feminist legal theorists are “drawn
together by the methodologies they use, such as consciousness-raising . . . unmasking patriarchy, the use
of stories and the political implications of personal experiences, an emphasis on voices not represented
in the dominant tradition, contextual reasoning that focuses on particulars of experience, and asking
questions about the gendered impact of policies or laws”).
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theme is the importance of starting from the realities of women’s
experience,19 and working toward ethical or other judgments “from the
ground up,” rather than starting from an abstract ideal, even a feminist one,
and “working down” toward a determination of a just result.
A third similarly related theme in feminist theory is to emphasize
relationality in ethical and jurisprudential decisions. Rather than conceiving
of the human in her basic essence and existence as autonomous and
unencumbered by the needs and demands of others, feminist theory
understands the human person as essentially and existentially related to
others. This feminist theme posits that the essence of a human being cannot
be understood except as she is connected to others.20 Some feminists, like
Robin West, have argued that women are connected in a unique and
undeniable way to others as a result of their ability to birth children.21 A
final theme feminist theory emphasizes is the importance of moving women
from positions of subordination to men toward relationships of equality.
Feminists differ, however, on what this means: some feminists understand
that goal as women’s empowerment or self-determination,22 while others
ask this question through the lens of complementarity or reciprocity
between men and women.23
Religious feminists might call for a somewhat different, more
complex, lens in describing an authentic experience of human existence that
has at its core a relationship with the Divine. We might express the
religious feminist experience, and the ethics and jurisprudence flowing
from it, as reflecting five relational values: gratitude, humility, compassion,
generosity, and integrity.24 This is not an exhaustive list of values we might

04/28/2016 10:11:02
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19
See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 4–5 (2003)
(describing feminist scholarship’s grounding in women’s experience). As an example, Clare Dalton has
explained that feminism is “the range of committed inquiry and activity dedicated first, to describing
women’s subordination—exploring its nature and extent; dedicated second to asking how—through
what mechanism, and why—for what complex and interwoven reasons—women continue to occupy that
position; and dedicated third, to change.” Clare Dalton, Where We Stand: Observations on the Situation
of Feminist Legal Thought, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 2 (1987) (emphasis in original).
20
CHAMALLAS, supra note 19, at 58–59 (describing West’s argument as an emphasis on
attachment, responsibility to others, empathy and relationships).
21
Id. at 58. But see the critique of West’s theory, id. at 83–84, for its exclusion of lesbian
relationships.
22
See PRESTON, supra note 17, at 27 (describing feminism as “allowing each woman to identify
and define herself socially, economically and politically without external obstacles . . . . It is permitting
choice, then valuing and respecting choices women make, at least to the extent choice is permitted and
respected for men in society”).
23
See, e.g., ELIZABETH R. SCHILTZ, A CONTEMPORARY CATHOLIC THEORY OF
COMPLEMENTARITY, FEMINISM, LAW, AND RELIGION 27 (Marie A. Failinger, Elizabeth R. Schiltz &
Susan J. Stabile eds., 2014).
24
Some will recognize these values as a partial list of the virtues recognized in both ancient
Greek and Roman, and later Christian and other thought. See ANDRE COMTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL
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TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUES: THE USES OF PHILOSOPHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 1–3 (Catherine
Temerson trans., 2001); STANLEY HAUERWAS & CHARLES PINCHES, CHRISTIANS AMONG THE VIRTUES:
THEOLOGICAL CONVERSATIONS WITH ANCIENT AND MODERN ETHICS 23 (2002) [hereinafter
HAUERWAS & PINCHES]. However, I eschew the use of the word “virtue” to avoid the implication that
these are qualities to be achieved by the self-willed striving of the individual, as the ancient Greeks
would understand a virtue. Rather, with feminist epistemology, I understand these values as proceeding
out of a true understanding of the nature of human life as relational. See id.
25
See, e.g., HAUERWAS & PINCHES, supra note 24, at 20 (describing Plato’s list of cardinal
virtues of courage, temperance, justice and wisdom; and Aristotle’s list that includes generosity,
magnificence, high-mindedness, gentleness, truthfulness, wittiness, friendship, shame and “a nameless
virtue between ambition and lack of ambition”).
26
Id. at 20.

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 29 Side B

want to see in a jurisprudence of human flourishing—virtue theorists will
recognize the absence of traditional virtues such as courage, temperance,
kindness, and justice.25 But, I want to highlight those values that are
especially associated with religious feminist thought and are especially
neglected in the jurisprudence of the Free Exercise Clause.
As we go down this road of describing a feminist lens on the Free
Exercise Clause, we must fully acknowledge another fact of life that most
religious traditions recognize: humans and human experience reflect both
good and evil. In many traditions, ethics, and indeed jurisprudence, must at
their core be a reflection on the tug of war between these values/virtues and
their opposites: against gratitude, envy, or self-absorption; against humility,
pride; against compassion, mercilessness; against generosity, hoarding; and
against integrity, inconstancy, or infidelity.26
Turning to the values especially characteristic of a religious feminist
approach, religious women would argue that an authentic experience of the
world necessarily engenders the response of gratitude. Even the human
person who is most entrapped in her physical limitations (the disabled, the
prisoner) and social constraints (the untouchable, the abused) has received
the gift of life in all of its complexity. The Alzheimer’s patient or the
quadriplegic can still experience joy and love and hope, as well as all that
the five senses—sight, sound, touch, smell, taste—have to offer as we move
through our lives. Even the emotionally abused and the socially degraded
person can go through life experiencing much, or most, of it as a horizon in
which many of those interactions that give life meaning are possible. For
example, one might argue that envying the material goods that one does not
have, or the social possibilities that one’s life has not offered, falsifies one’s
own existence. That envy is false not only because it ignores those goods
and experiences an individual person does have, but it also pretends that
these things out of reach are a necessary part of creating one’s own
authentic life.
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Id. at 121.
Id.
29
Id.
30
Psalm 139:14 (NIV).
31
See HAUERWAS & PINCHES, supra note 24, at 47 (discussing the way in which we learn that
no man is an island, and the importance of a community of friends).
32
See DOROTHEE SOELLE & SHIRLEY A. CLOYES, TO WORK AND TO LOVE: A THEOLOGY OF
CREATION 29 (1984) (“My choices are limited by virtue of my being made from dust. And the
theological question that ensues is: Can I affirm myself as one who is made from dust? Can I say that
my having been created is very good? How do I, as a person made from dust, respond to the ontological
project of being created for freedom . . . . Is it possible for me to value my ‘creatureliness’ in the
knowledge that my existence was willed prior to my birth, that I am not here on this earth simply by
chance, that I am needed, that I am not a disposable object, and that I am designed for freedom and
equality?”).
33
See Marc Kolden, Work and Meaning: Some Theological Reflections, 48 INTERPRETATION
28
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Women in the monotheistic religions would argue that all of these
good things, which constitute our individual lives, are blessings from the
Divine, and the only true response to such blessings is gratitude.27 For a
religious person, gratitude is a two-fold response. First, it is realism: it tells
how things really are, by giving proper acknowledgement of the source and
giver of these blessings, as well as the blessings themselves.28 Second, it
recognizes that the only truly human response in a situation in which full
reciprocity is not possible because of the vast imbalance between giver and
recipient is gratitude—gratitude is a reaching out to the giver that
acknowledges not only the gift given, but also how the recipient
experiences that gift.29 In the Western monotheistic traditions, that
experience of gratitude and awe is captured in the Psalmist’s
acknowledgement, “I praise you because I am fearfully and wonderfully
made; your works are wonderful, I know that full well.”30
That same experience of each person’s relationship with the Creator
and the created world around her also engenders a necessary response of
humility. To see the world truly requires one not only to understand the
fullness of human existence and the capacity that lies within each person
over a lifetime, but also the limitations built into any one person’s possible
life-course, or any one community’s history.31 The monotheistic traditions,
among others, demand recognition that we humans are not only creators,
but also creatures. Our creatureliness carries with it the baggage of physical
limitations: within this skin, we can only see so much, carry so much, learn
so much. But perhaps even more significantly, we must contend with the
moral limitations: we will fail more often than we succeed in being
everything our neighbor needs.32 In the Christian tradition in which I
learned these values, we acknowledge that this moral limitation is not only
due to our creatureliness—our inability to understand and to act—but also
our willful refusal to understand and to do what our neighbor requires.33

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 30 Side B

04/28/2016 10:11:02

05 - FAILINGER_FINAL_4.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

54

FIU Law Review

4/25/16 9:24 PM

[Vol. 11:47

C M
Y K

04/28/2016 10:11:02

262, 263 (1994).
34
See Joy Ann McDougal, Sin-No More? A Feminist Re-Visioning of a Christian Theology of
Sin, 88 ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REV. 215 (2006).
35
See Yvonne A. Tamayo, Rhymes with Rich: Power, Law and the Bitch, 21 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 281, 287 (2009) (quoting Professor Susan Estrich’s description of the bargain women have struck
to be submissive, due to “a lifetime of learned behavior resulting in gender-determined beliefs that
power, control, and authority are inherently masculine qualities, while humility, docility, and
compliance embody desirable feminine traits”).
36
COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 24, at 140, 145.
37
Id. at 147. Comte-Sponville cleverly, and perhaps ironically, argues that a truly humble person
would be led to atheism, since “[h]umanity makes for such a pathetic creation: how can we believe a
God could have wanted this?” Id. (emphasis in original).
38
Ana Novoa, Lessons from La Morenita Del Tepeyac, 20 J.L. & RELIGION 267, 290 n.123
(2004–05) (distinguishing humility from subservience).
39 COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 24, at 105.
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Whether to recognize that humility is a feminist value has been a
source of great contention in feminist thought. Some have suggested that
humility is to women what pride is to men—that is, women’s greatest sin is
to belittle and erase their own selves, violating the essential value of respect
for all persons.34 Others have argued that women’s humility is a harmful
consequence of centuries of subordination, the greatest emotional damage
done to women, which can only be rectified by empowering women toward
independence as autonomous selves.35
However, humility, understood rightly, is “not a lack of awareness; it
is the extreme awareness of the limits of all virtue and one’s own limits as
well . . . [it] is not contempt for oneself” or “the flip side of a kind of selfhatred . . . [r]emorse, bad conscience, or shame.”36 It is rather “the effort
through which the self attempts to free itself of its illusions about itself” and
becomes “exposed to love and to the light.”37 For women, humility exposes
the illusion that we can do everything, and be everything, for those whom
we love and we care for; humility helps us find a realistic balance between
our power and our powerlessness, our love and its limitations, our strength
and our weakness. Ana Novoa argues, “Humility of course is truth.
Humility recognizes strength and giftedness, and further recognizes those
and all other attributes as gifts. It is our responsibility in humility to accept,
honor, affirm and use the ways in which we are gifted.”38
Third, the values of generosity and compassion go hand in hand in a
religious feminist jurisprudence. Compassion is the understanding that
precedes generosity. It is to choose to participate, intellectually and
emotionally, in the experience of others, particularly the suffering of
others.39 It is to “refuse[] to regard any suffering as a matter of indifference
or any living being as a thing . . . [it] is the opposite of cruelty, which
rejoices in the suffering of others, and of egoism, which is indifferent to that
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Id. at 106.
Christians recognize that human existence is marked by human sin as well as goodness.
Theologically, it is “the substitution of some other reality for God, the placing of oneself or some
created thing where God alone should stand.” In Christian theology, sin also encompasses “the state of
alleged independence, of asserted self-sufficiency” and “of that ‘hardness of heart’ that lasts, the ears
that will not hear and the eyes that will not see” the “claims and prerogatives of God.” TIMOTHY F.
O’CONNELL, PRINCIPLES FOR A CATHOLIC MORALITY 68–69 (1978).
42
COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 24, at 88–89.
43
See id. at 88.
44
See id. at 86.
45
Id.
46
See, e.g., Ronald Duty, The Right to Property and Daily Bread: Thinking with Luther About
Human Economic Rights, J. LUTHERAN ETHICS (Feb. 1, 2009), www.elca.org/JLE/Articles/408
(Luther’s theology “presumes that God gives these things abundantly for all, not that they are inherently
scarce and available only for some. It assumes that there is a holistic relationship between individuals,
41

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 31 Side A

suffering.”40
Such participation in the life of the Other is complex, and in conditions
of sin,41 cautionary instructions are important. In a perfect world, perhaps,
compassion would be characterized by the emptying of one’s own
experience and commitments to embrace the experience of the Other, a way
of walking in solidarity through his pain. In conditions of sin, however,
compassion can be easily distorted: as finite human beings, we can
misunderstand the experience of the Other, or unconsciously substitute our
own experience, which is more accessible to each of us, for the experience
of the Other. When we mistake egoism for compassion, we can impose
upon the Other assumptions and actions that are, at best, disrespectful to
that person’s authentic self, and at worst, downright harmful. A perhaps
helpful corrective is to temper compassion with self-reflection on the
human experience of solidarity, i.e., the realization that we are in fact
interdependent, that there is self-interest in our care for the other, just as the
Other has an interest in reciprocating our care.42 Yet, solidarity, unless it is
truly universally conceived, is also limiting: if we act solely out of
solidarity, then we will not extend our recognition of suffering to those
whose interests seem more remote to our own interests and goals, e.g.,
those who are geographically or socially distant, or politically or
economically at odds with us.43
Generosity responds to this experiencing of the Other’s pain with
action. Comte-Sponville distinguishes generosity, this “virtue of giving,”
from the virtue of justice: in doing justice, we give every person his or her
own due.44 In enacting generosity, we give a person not what is rightly his
or hers, but what is rightly ours as earthly justice conceives it.45 (For
Christians and many other religious believers, of course, nothing is “rightly
ours” as human justice would calculate since everything comes from the
generosity of the Creator.)46 A different relational dynamic also attends our
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acting justly versus our acting generously. Comte-Sponville argues that
“generosity is more subjective, more individual, more affective and more
spontaneous, while justice . . . is always somewhat more objective, more
universal, more intellectual and more considered.”47
Finally, a religious feminist jurisprudence would require the embrace
of integrity with its twin, fidelity.48 For a religious feminist, the concept of
integrity goes beyond the common definitions. Integrity does not simply
mean the opposite of dishonesty, or even the notion that one’s life-course
demonstrates an “integral whole,” that one is faithful to one’s own selfconception.49 Rather, integrity means the constancy in one’s own character
that is constituted by and reflected in constancy to others50 and, for religious
people, to God. To be faithful means to “admit to being the same, because I
take the responsibility of a certain past as my own, and because I intend to
recognize my present commitment[s] as still my own in the future.”51 To be
valuable, one’s integrity, the fidelity to self and to others that flows from it,
must be directed toward a good value—for example, faithfulness to the
truth, faithfulness to “the historicity of a value, to an always particular
presence within us of the past, whether it be the collective past of
humanity . . . or a more individual past, our own or that of our parent.”52
Fidelity embraces the promise to be constant as a person who [shows]
faithfulness in loving one’s neighbor as one is able.
II. THE EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS WOMEN AND THE CONSTITUTION
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God, and others in a human community that is both mutually responsive and mutually responsible. His
view of daily bread also presumes that there is a natural mutual dependence of human beings on God
and each other for the things needed for human life. Furthermore, it sees human life and whatever is
needed to sustain it as a gift of God and therefore as good.”).
47
COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 24, at 87.
48
See, e.g., Clea F. Fees & Jonathan Webber, Constancy, Fidelity, and Integrity, in THE
HANDBOOK OF VIRTUE ETHICS 35 (Stan van Hooft & Nicole Saunders eds., 2013) (describing the
virtues of constancy, fidelity, and integrity as forming a cluster of traits that are orientations toward
personal commitments).
49
See id. at 14–15.
50
Id. at 15–16.
51 COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 24, at 21.
52
Id. at 22, 23, 25.
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With this introduction to the themes that might characterize the
interpretive commitments of a religious feminist reading of the Free
Exercise Clause, we might explore whether women plaintiffs in the Court’s
Free Exercise cases have lived out, or been judged by a religious feministinformed vision of the Constitution. Because it is especially hard to hear the
voice of most of these women in the pages of the U.S. Reports, our task
must be primarily speculative and imaginative.
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Commonwealth v. Prince, 46 N.E.2d 755, 755 (Mass. 1943).
See Appellant’s Brief at 7, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (No. 98), 1943 WL
54417, at *7 (noting that “Perkins reminded Mrs. Prince that he had warned her about a year previous
concerning her permitting her two sons, Donald and William, to engage in the ‘selling’ of ‘the
magazines.’ He also told her that on a prior occasion he had discussed the law with her and even let her
read the law. He also said he had written a letter to her explaining the law.”) (citations omitted).
55
See Chuck E. Smith, 16 J.L. & RELIGION 547 (2001) (reviewing SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS,
JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION (2000)).
56
See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881, 885 (1990).
57
Prince, 46 N.E.2d at 756.
58
Id.
59
On the prevalence and hazards of night work by children before child labor legislation was
passed, see Marie A, Failinger, Too Cheap for Anybody but Us: Toward a Theory and Practice of Good
Child Labor, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 1035, 1058, 1063–64, 1076 (2004).
60
Id. at 1056, 1066–67.
54
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We might start with the zealous proselytizer about which we know the
most, Sarah Prince. Reviewing her case with the precious few facts we
have, we might speculate that Sarah Prince perhaps understood the values at
the heart of a religious feminist expression of the Constitution at least a
little better than law enforcement. Sarah was criminally accused of violating
Massachusetts’ child labor laws by bringing her niece, nine-year-old Betty
Simmons, onto a street corner with her to distribute publications of the
Jehovah’s Witnesses.53 In one reading of the facts, Prince was perhaps
arrested simply for repeatedly disobeying the school attendance officer’s
attempts to stop her from bringing Betty with her to hand out these
magazines.54 It is also possible to wonder, against the background of this
period, if the Prince case is one of the many involving the persecution of
Jehovah’s Witnesses simply because they were “troublesome” religious
dissenters.55
But, even reading this case in the best light for the prosecution, neither
Prince’s arrest, nor the Supreme Court’s subsequent affirmance suggests
anything but a formulaic application of the law to these cases, a clear
precursor to Justice Scalia’s call in Employment Division v. Smith for
uniform application above all else.56 The context for Prince’s arrest was a
far cry from the conditions that gave rise to the Massachusetts child labor
laws. Betty was handing out two religious magazines for what her magazine
bag advertised as a contribution of five cents apiece.57 She was in company
of her guardian, who was standing on the street corner twenty feet away
from Sarah.58 The local authorities could clearly see Betty was not a
“newsie” running the streets, nor a young girl alone in danger of being
assaulted by strangers.59 Nor was her aunt a depraved capitalist exploiting
child labor so she did not have to pay her adult workers a fair wage, another
impetus for the anti-child labor movement.60 Betty herself testified that,
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“she was doing this work because she loved the Lord and He commands us
to do it. She declared that it was her way of worshiping Almighty God.”61
The all-male Supreme Court, even without knowing Sarah or Betty, or
the full context in which Betty was being raised, also rejects her claim,
positing a hypothetical parade of horribles that they believed justified
criminalization of Prince’s activity. Like the authorities below, their view of
what was at stake for Betty Simmons does not seem at all related to the
actual facts of the case:
The zealous though lawful exercise of the right to engage in propagandizing the community, whether in religious, political or other
matters, may, and at times does, create situations difficult enough for
adults to cope with and wholly inappropriate for children, especially of
tender years, to face. Other harmful possibilities could be stated, of
emotional excitement and psychological or physical injury. Parents
may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow they
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children
before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they
can make that choice for themselves.62
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In this passage, the Court reiterates two assumptions of the traditional
view of rights that do not square with the feminist approach. First, they
assume adult rights-holders are autonomous citizens who are properly
empowered to make even foolish “martyr” choices about what is in their
own best interest. Second, they assume that young women and girls are too
emotionally and physically fragile to engage in public life: street
proselytization, even with loving supervision, can lead to “emotional
excitement, and psychological or physical injury.”63
The Court’s analysis betrays an unwillingness to exercise compassion
or humility—the Justices are unwilling to put themselves in the shoes of a
religionist engaging in activity that they simply do not understand except
through the abstract lens of child abuse or neglect. The Justices also cannot
seem to acknowledge that they really do not know whether Sarah Prince
accurately claims that her family’s street proselytization is essential to her
niece’s salvation. The opinion treats “martyrdom” (an excessive word for
street proselytization, to be sure) as a personal idiosyncrasy of a zealot
rather than as a possible call to duty from the Divine. Ironically, the Court
61
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Id.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169–70 (U.S. 1944).
63
Alma Lovell, who went alone but with the same goals, won her case, arguing that seeking
prior approval from secular authority for distributing the Good News would violate her faith, though
under the Press Clause rather than the Free Exercise Clause. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 448
(1938). It is not clear whether the Court thought that Lovell, an adult woman, was more capable of
making a “martyr” choice, or simply more entitled under the Constitution to do so.
62
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Prince, 321 U.S. at 164.
See id. at 170 (citing with approval Massachusetts’ decision that “an absolute prohibition,
though one limited to streets and public places and to the incidental uses proscribed, is necessary to
accomplish its legitimate objectives. Its power to attain them is broad enough to reach these peripheral
instances in which the parent’s supervision may reduce but cannot eliminate entirely the ill effects of the
prohibited conduct.”).
66
Again, in conditions of sin, we have to recognize that the converse may be true—perhaps
Sarah’s “compassion” for Betty’s welfare was nothing more than the imposition of her own beliefs and
understanding of Betty’s spiritual situation, as the Court implies, and Betty’s coercion into “martyrdom”
in service of Sarah’s own commitments.
67
See Prince, 321 U.S. at 162.
68
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 54, at 4–6 (noting in several places that distribution of the
literature was God’s command). Some describe Jehovah’s Witnesses beliefs as that “a person must
manifest his faith in the manner Christ did by dedicating himself to Jehovah God, symbolizing that
dedication by water immersion, and making public proclamation of the truth. He must be a teacher of
65
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reaches this conclusion despite its glancing recognition that something
important may indeed be at stake for Betty: “The other freedom is the
child’s, to observe these [tenets], and among them is ‘to preach the
gospel . . . by public distribution of “Watchtower” and “Consolation,” in
conformity with the scripture: “A little child shall lead them.”‘“64
In these circumstances, the Court could easily have carefully crafted an
exception or distinguished this case on several grounds from the
paradigmatic cases for which the child labor laws were passed. Sarah Prince
was not an exploiting employer sending her charges out into the dangers of
the night street; she was a watchful supervisor of the children in her care.
Hers was not a commercial, but a religious venture. But, in the Court’s
desire to elevate the abstract principle, the demand for uniformity in the
face of contextual difference, the Court would not carve out such an
exception.65
By contrast, though we cannot be sure from the scant facts we have,
Sarah’s behavior seems to better mimic the values of religious feminist
thought. Sarah, Betty’s custodian, has accepted the responsibility for her
niece’s religious education and spiritual welfare; and far from attempting to
exploit her labor for gain, she risks arrest to engage her niece in those
activities she understands as critical to her niece’s religious education and
salvation.66 As Sarah understands the situation, Betty is simply carrying out
the Lord’s commands to preach the Gospel to every person.67 As such,
Sarah is likely exercising the virtue of gratitude—she understands that her
religious calling to tell the Good News is responsive to the gifts that God
has bestowed on Betty and her, most importantly the gift of everlasting life.
She understands the Divine charge given to her to care for Betty, neither
leaving Betty alone at home, nor leaving Betty alone to care for her own
spiritual health. Instead, Sarah engages Betty in the work that, as Sarah
understands it, is life giving for Betty.68
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What the constable assumes to be sheer stubbornness, the refusal to
obey his authority after he repeatedly attempts to get Sarah Prince to stop
bringing children with her, might instead be an exercise in integrity. Even at
the risk of arrest, Sarah chooses fidelity in her relationship to Betty and
Betty’s well-being; she chooses to “walk the talk” by teaching Betty in her
deeds as well as her words that faithfulness to the commands of God is the
highest form of fidelity. Her work provides a witness to her niece Betty that
the reward for obedience to the Divine transcends even the comforts of this
life that attend conformity to the expectations of the powerful, the
authorities.
Indeed, there is some argument that Sarah herself is not simply a
willful, aberrant zealot, but a citizen who is exercising the virtues of
compassion and generosity for the public. Sarah explains that she and Betty
hand out these religious messages “[f]or no other reason . . . but to tell the
people of the one place of safety, that is in the kingdom of God under Christ
that we prayed for.”69 For Sarah, the street is her church, the place where
she and her niece are called in obedience to God’s design for salvation for
the whole world. Sarah’s faith compels her to preach this good news to
unbelievers, and to train her niece to do so. That this is a central tenet of her
faith, the Court is not able to deny, but also does not choose to respect.70
Alma Lovell makes a similar powerful testimony about her responsibility to those unbelievers she is encountering on the street:
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God’s Word and purposes. He cannot remain silent, thinking that belief alone is sufficient for salvation.
Silence is not God’s way to it.” Matt Slick, A Jehovah’s Witness Must Become Worthy of Salvation,
CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS AND RESEARCH MINISTRY (Oct. 24, 2015), http://carm.org/religiousmovements/jehovahs-witnesses/jehovahs-witness-must-become-worthy-salvation.
69
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 54, at 9.
70
The United States Supreme Court in Prince notes, “The rights of children to exercise their
religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage them in the practice of religious
belief, as against preponderant sentiment and assertion of state power voicing it, have had recognition
here . . . .” Prince, 321 U.S. at 165. For more on the importance of evangelism for a Jehovah’s Witness,
see Fulfill Your Role as an Evangelizer, THE WATCHTOWER, May 15, 2013, www.jw.org/en/
publications/magazines/w20130515/successful-evangelizer.
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We bring to the people the proofs that the time is at hand for the
establishment of the kingdom of Jehovah God. The present disturbed
condition of the nations, with the perplexity and distress prevailing
among the people, are among the evidences that Satan’s rule over the
earth is nearing its end, and will be followed by God’s kingdom which
will bring righteousness and peace to all people who are willing to
hear and obey Almighty God. I was doing this work in obedience to
God’s law which says, “And this gospel of the kingdom shall be
preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations: and then shall
the end come.” Matthew 24:14. I am a Christian and have entered into
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a covenant or agreement to do the will of God and obey His commandments. Therefore it is incumbent upon me to obey His mandate to
preach the gospel. “For necessity is laid upon me; yea, woe is unto me,
if I preach not the gospel!”71
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71
Appellant’s Brief at 4, Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (No. 391) 1937 WL
41018, at *4.
72
Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 448 (1938).
73
Id.
74
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).
75
Id. at 399 n.1.
76
Id.; Brief for the Appellant at 6, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (No. 526) 1963 WL
105527, at *6.
77
Brief for the Appellant, supra note 76, at 6.
78
Id. at 7–10.
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Even the Supreme Court recognizes Lovell’s belief that she “is sent by
Jehovah to do His work,” and that to stop would be “an act of disobedience
to His commandment.”72 The Court reluctantly concludes, using autonomy
as its backdrop, that as an adult, Alma is constitutionally entitled to risk her
safety or her good name by walking the streets to hand out literature. Lovell
wins her case under the Press Clause, successfully arguing that seeking
prior approval from secular authority for distributing the Good News would
violate her faith.73
We might also look at the women in Free Exercise cases who were
forced to choose between their faith and their family’s well-being. Perhaps
the most famous female Free Exercise plaintiff, Adell Sherbert, was denied
unemployment benefits because she refused to work on her Sabbath.74 The
plant where she had worked for thirty-five years suddenly changed its work
policy to require that employees be available for work on Saturdays.75 In
this narrative, Sherbert, a relatively recent convert to the Seventh Day
Adventist Church, which teaches that Christians are forbidden to work from
sundown Friday to sundown Saturday, followed the demands of her religion
and missed six work Saturdays.76
Sherbert, demonstrating a spirit of generosity and compassion, not
only informed her supervisor of this conflict with her faith before missing
work, to no avail, but also offered to be available for any work that would
not require her to work Saturdays.77 Yet, the unemployment compensation
agency refused to find her “available for work,” despite the fact that such
work was likely available if they had only worked with her: over 150 other
Adventists in the area were employed without incident in jobs not requiring
Saturday work.78
By contrast to Adell Sherbert, the government enforcers of the South
Carolina law rigidly refused to exercise the virtues of compassion and
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generosity. They refused to walk in Sherbert’s shoes and offer her an
accommodation which would alleviate the harsh consequences to a blue
collar factory worker of lost wages and lost unemployment compensation.
Neither would they seriously consider whether providing an exception for
Sherbert, given the context, would frustrate the law in fact. We may surmise
that they rested their decision on their “slippery slope” worry that it would
be hard to deny an exemption in other more difficult cases where
religionists asked for exemptions.
Paula Hobbie, also a recent Seventh Day Adventist convert, was
similarly fired for refusing to work at her job as a jewelry store manager
from Friday to Saturday.79 Once again in her case, the Court confronted an
employer and an unemployment compensation agency that refused to
compromise: while Hobbie’s supervisor worked out a schedule to permit
Hobbie to exercise her faith and still remain employed, the general manager
told her to be available for every shift or be fired. Despite this
intransigence, the unemployment agency found that her refusal to work was
“misconduct” that made her ineligible for benefits.80
In Sherbert and Hobbie, and the intervening case of Thomas v.
Unemployment Division,81 the Supreme Court took a quite different
approach than the Justices employed in the Prince case. Following the wellknown case of Sherbert v. Verner, which held sway in the Supreme Court
for twenty-seven years, the Court in Thomas wrote:

Thus, both Sherbert and Thomas held that refusals to permit individuals to exercise their religious beliefs in their daily lives could be justified
only by the State’s proof of a compelling interest. This constitutional turn of
events could be explained in many ways—perhaps, like Lovell, the Court
was simply recognizing Sherbert’s right to exercise her autonomy, or was
concerned that the state was encroaching over the line between state and
church. Yet, between Sherbert and Hobbie, another explanation is plausible.

Hobbie v. Unemp’t Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 130, 138 (1987).
Id.
81
450 U.S. 707 (1981).
82
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981) (referring as
precedent for this point to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
80
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Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby
putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and
to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is
nonetheless substantial.82
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Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 143.
406 U.S. 205, 207 n.1 (1972).
Id. at 237.
Id. at 242 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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In Hobbie, the State attempted to factually (and incorrectly) distinguish
Sherbert on the grounds that Hobbie had recently converted, which in the
government’s view put the responsibility for causing the problem on her:
“Hobbie was the ‘agent of change’ and is therefore responsible for the
consequences of the conflict between her job and her religious beliefs.”83
Once again, in these cases, the government offered the “autonomous
citizen” model as a paradigm for the Court—for the government, religion is
a “choice” that one makes separately from family and friends, from history
or tradition, from one’s other values and experiences. It is a “choice” for
which the individual is “responsible” if it interferes with the rules of the
market-based workaday world that are the presumed to be the proper
standard for human experience.
However, the Sherbert Court rejects this understanding of the role of
religion in the life of the believer. Instead, under the Sherbert test, it is the
government’s responsibility to exercise compassion—to walk in the shoes
of Sherbert and Hobbie, to engage them in the context of their own
religious understanding. Or at the least, the Court suggests, the state is
required to respect the fact that these minority religionists might be refusing
to work because of an authentic understanding of their own relationship
with God and their employers, including their belief that, out of gratitude,
they owed God their full engagement in praise and thanksgiving for one day
out of the week. Sherbert v. Verner requires the government to see this
expression of faith, and to consider whether there is any alternative way of
meeting the state’s interest besides violating these women’s relationships
with God.
We know little of Frieda Yoder or Barbara Miller, two fifteen-year-old
children of the father-defendants in Wisconsin v. Yoder.84 We do know that
Frieda, alone among the Amish children, testified to her own belief in the
Amish Christian tradition and way of life, and her desire to live according
to its tenets.85 While the Yoders won their case through application of the
Sherbert rule, it is important to note in Justice Douglas’ dissent some
skepticism about whether the Amish children in this case were capable of
making, and permitted to make, independent judgments about the wisdom
of ending their public education. In Douglas’ view, “the inevitable effect [of
giving the parents a choice regarding their children’s schooling] is to
impose the parents’ notions of religious duty upon their children.”86
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To salute a flag means in effect that the person saluting the flag
ascribes salvation and protection to the thing or power which the flag
stands for and represents, and that since the flag and the government
which it symbolizes are of the world and not of Jehovah God, it is
wrong to salute the flag, and to do so denies the supremacy of
Almighty God, and contravenes His express command as set forth in
Holy Writ.90

Id. at 243.
Id. (emphasis added).
89
Respondent’s Brief at 5, Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (No. 690),
1940 WL 46893, at *5.
90
Id.
88
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Douglas’ dissent embodies the ambivalence of judicial attempts to
exercise humility about the courts’ understanding of the experiences and
religious commitments of the litigants before them. On one hand, Douglas’
opinion seems to be a commendable attempt to bypass the opinions of state
officials and the children’s fathers to understand the situation and
commitments of the Amish children who were affected by this conflict, a
conflict in which they were treated as bystanders rather than central actors.
On the other hand, Justice Douglas has great difficulty actually
foregoing the temptation to substitute his own experience and imagination
for that of Frieda Yoder and Barbara Miller. While he grudgingly concedes
that Frieda testified that she herself had rejected high school because of her
own religious belief, he expresses skepticism about whether Barbara
Miller’s or any other Amish child’s choice, is in fact the real choice of that
child.87 Reiterating a tradition understanding that religion is an autonomous
decision made by a separated individual—”religion is an individual
experience.”88—he seems to reject as foolish the possibility that Frieda or
Barbara can live the fullest lives possible to them as members of a closeknit faith community that rejects material success and worldly education. In
so doing, he rejects the value of integrity, the notion that a life lived in
faithfulness to relationships that these children have formed with their
family and community may be more intrinsically beneficial to all than a life
in which these children “explore their full potential,” as an individualist
understanding of democratic freedom might define it.
Lillian Gobitis and Lucie McClure come to us almost as afterthoughts
in the pages of the Supreme Court. Lillian, age twelve, was the older of two
children expelled from a Minersville, Pennsylvania, public school in the
Gobitis case, for refusing to salute the flag because they understood that it
was forbidden by Exodus 20.89 The Witnesses described their refusal to
salute as a theological necessity:
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Lucie was the third named plaintiff in the case that has come to be
known as West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, overturning
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gobitis, that a state could expel a child for
failing to salute the flag, under the Speech Clause.91 The plaintiffs explained
that:
[The Gobitis family members] are members of an unincorporated
association of Christian people designated as Jehovah’s Witnesses;
that each and every one of Jehovah’s Witnesses has entered into an
agreement or covenant with Jehovah God, wherein they have
consecrated themselves to do His will and to obey his commandments:
they . . . believe that a failure to obey the precepts in the Bible will
result in their eternal destruction.92
Once again, the Gobitis and Barnette plaintiffs recognize the
importance of integrity understood as faithfulness to those with whom they
are in relationship. On the one hand, they keep their covenant—their
promise—to God and their religious community to give loyalty where it
belongs. On the other, they are willing to acknowledge the lesser covenant
they have as members of the political community. In both cases, these
children stand “in respectful silence” while the non-Witness children
saluted the flag. Moreover, the Barnette plaintiffs offered the state a
patriotic pledge which would not compromise their religious beliefs while
still respecting the state’s concern that the schools “are dealing with the
formative period in the development in citizenship” and that teaching civic
participation was an important part of the public school curriculum.93 That
pledge read:

In Gobitis, the Witnesses also proved that their children “were always
diligent to obey every rule of the school except the rule relating to the
formal saluting of the flag” and that their community “willingly and
diligently obey[s] all the laws of the state when such laws do not conflict
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91 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overturning Gobitis v. Minersville
Sch. Dist., 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
92
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 89, at 4.
93
Appellees’ Brief at 5, W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (No. 591), 1943
WL 71856, at *5.
94
Id. at 8.
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I have pledged my unqualified allegiance and devotion to Jehovah, the
Almighty God, and to His Kingdom, for which Jesus commands all
Christians to pray. I respect the flag of the United States and
acknowledge it as a symbol of freedom and justice to all. I pledge
allegiance and obedience to all the laws of the United States that are
consistent with God’s law, as set forth in the Bible.94
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with the law of Almighty God.”95
Yet, the Witnesses’ pervasive showing of patriotic respect and offer to
compromise with the state was met with stubborn resistance by state school
officials: With no apparent sense of irony, in its resolution requiring salute
of the flag, the West Virginia Board of Education began its edict by
recognizing,
[that] one’s convictions about the ultimate mystery of the universe and
man’s relation to it [are] placed beyond the reach of law[;] . . . [that the
p]ropagation of belief . . . is protected, whether in church or chapel,
mosque or synagogue, tabernacle or meeting house[; that the
Constitutions of the United States and of the State
of West Virginia assure] . . . generous immunity to the individual from
imposition of penalty for offending, in the course of his own religious
activities, the religious views of others, be they a minority or those
who are dominant in the government.96

We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities
that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional
eccentricity and abnormal attitudes. When they are so harmless to
others or to the State as those we deal with here, the price is not too
great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the

96
97
98
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Nevertheless, the Board determined that it is “an act of insubordination” for
children or their teachers to refuse to salute the flag, an “emblem of
freedom in its truest, best sense . . . liberty regulated by law, protection of
the weak against the strong.”97
As is well-known, the Supreme Court reversed Gobitis and the school
expulsions in Barnette, giving us one of the grand summaries of American
jurisprudence, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens
to confess by word or act their faith therein.”98
What is not remembered is the way in which the Court, just before this
stirring phrase, discounts and disrespects both the validity and the value of
the dissent the Barnette children and their parents offered.

Respondent’s Brief, supra note 89, at 4.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 593 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 (1943).
Id. at 642.
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existing order.99
We see in that paragraph the way in which the Court has grounded its
Free Exercise jurisprudence in a conception of the individual as an
autonomous (perhaps strange, perhaps odd) free thinker, a theme that
surfaces in other cases like United States v. Seeger100 and Gillette v. United
States.101 In this way, religious freedom is formulated as a means to protect
freedom of (aberrant) thought, not as a way of nourishing foundational
values necessary to a flourishing democratic society.102
III. THE VOICES OF THE WOMEN JUSTICES ON RELIGION AND THE STATE

99
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Id. at 641–42.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965).
101
See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1967).
102
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 564 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 219 (1986)). There, O’Connor adopts as a rationale for protecting Free Exercise, the
Founders’ “shared . . . conviction that true religion and good morals are the only solid foundation of
public liberty and happiness.” Id. at 564.
103
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1841–54 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
104
Id. at 1842–43 (asking the reader to “[s]uppose, for example, that government officials in a
predominantly Jewish community asked a rabbi to begin all public functions with a chanting of the
Sh’ma and V’ahavta. (‘Hear O Israel! The Lord our God, the Lord is One . . . Bind [these words] as a
sign upon your hand; let them be a symbol before your eyes; inscribe them on the doorposts of your
house, and on your gates.’) Or assume officials in a mostly Muslim town requested a muezzin to
commence such functions, over and over again, with a recitation of the Adhan. (‘God is greatest, God is
greatest. I bear witness that there is no deity but God. I bear witness that Muhammed is the Messenger
of God.’)”).
105
Id. at 1843.
100
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We might also explore whether we hear a “different voice” in the
opinions of the women Justices in Religion Clause cases, and if so, if the
development of Religion Clause jurisprudence has been influenced by their
presence on the Court. Although it is one of the newest cases by the newest
Justice, and not a Free Exercise case, a discernible difference can be seen in
Town of Greece v. Galloway, challenging the practice of sectarian prayer in
the Town of Greece under the Establishment Clause.103 Justice Elena Kagan
begins her dissenting opinion with three hypotheticals, all of them
beginning with the invitation for the reader to put him or herself in the place
of a minority religionist, by imagining that “[y]ou are” a litigant asked to
pray before a trial, a voter asked to pray at the election booth, an immigrant
asked to pray at a naturalization ceremony.104 Or, she asks, what if “you
are” a Christian subjected to a Jewish or Muslim prayer in a public
setting?105 Finally, she places “you,” the reader, into the very scenario
raised in the case, extensively discussing the way in which the very context
of the case imposes a hardship on religious dissenters. She asks the reader
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to empathize with the position the Town of Greece has put that dissenter in:
Perhaps she feels sufficient pressure to go along—to rise, bow her
head, and join in whatever others are saying: After all, she wants, very
badly, what the judge or poll worker or immigration official has to
offer. Or perhaps she is made of stronger mettle, and she opts not to
participate in what she does not believe—indeed, what would, for her,
be something like blasphemy. She then must make known her dissent
from the common religious view, and place herself apart from other
citizens, as well as from the officials responsible for the invocations.106
In this extended exercise in imagination, Justice Kagan entreats her
audience to a reading of the Establishment Clause that evokes all of the
virtues we are discussing. First, she asks the Court’s audience to exercise
compassion, to “walk with” the religious dissenter as she both feels the
sting of rejection and decides the course of least damage in responding to it.
Second, she hints that a reading of the Establishment Clause should go
beyond what might be “due” the religious dissenter under the Court’s
existing precedents such as Marsh v. Chambers107 or its doctrines such as
the anti-coercion rule championed by Justices Scalia and Kennedy.108
Moreover, hers is not the argument about protecting religious
idiosyncrasy or autonomy we have seen in other Religion Clause cases such
as Prince. Rather, she suggests that what is at stake is the relational nature
of our polity, the relationship of citizens to each other:

Indeed, like our women plaintiffs in the Free Exercise cases, she not
only bids her fellow citizens to recognize their bond with the religious
dissenters they are excluding by these practices, but offers, in a spirit of
compromise, “None of this means that Greece’s town hall must be religionor prayer-free.”110 Officials simply must take “especial care” to include
every citizen as an equally valuable citizen.111

107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 1844.
463 U.S. 783 (1946).
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1850.
Id.
Id.
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What the circumstances here demand is the recognition that we are a
pluralistic people too. When citizens of all faiths come to speak to each
other and their elected representatives in a legislative session, the
government must take especial care to ensure that the prayers they hear
will seek to include, rather than serve to divide. No more is required—
but that much is crucial—to treat every citizen, of whatever religion, as
an equal participant in her government.109
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465 U.S. 668 (1984).
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
114
Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s description of the Lemon test skews toward the relational and
contextual. In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, 493 U.S. 378, 393
(1999) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615), she claims that Lemon “requires examination of ‘the character
and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority.’”
115
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 624–25 (1989) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at
694).
116
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (quoting
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630).
117
Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015).
118
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722–23 (2005) (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
327 (2003)).
113
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In making this argument, Justice Kagan takes up an arguably feminist
constitutional position embracing contextuality, compassion, generosity,
and integrity that Justice Sandra Day O’Connor first took in Lynch v.
Donnelly.112 Like Justice Kagan, in Lynch, Justice O’Connor insisted on
going farther into contextual review than even the Lemon formula,113 which
asks for an “on-the-ground” review of government officials’ intentions as
well as the consequence of their actions and their “entanglement” with
religion.114 In her formulation of what has come to be known as the nonendorsement principle in Lynch and County of Allegheny, both involving
crèches on public land Justice O’Connor called for an approach that is
highly attuned to the relationships and situation posed by Establishment
Clause cases: “[e]very government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or
disapproval of religion.”115 Moreover, she notes later, that judgment must
include the “‘history and ubiquity’ of a practice . . . because it provides part
of the context in which a reasonable observer evaluates whether a
challenged governmental practice conveys a message of endorsement
of religion.”116
The other women Justices have followed her in making this demand
for a contextual approach to religious dissenter claims. For example, Justice
Sotomayor’s recent concurring opinion in the recent Holt v. Hobbs
decision, protecting a Muslim prisoner’s right to wear a short beard under
RLUIPA, notes, “Nothing in the Court’s opinion calls into question our
prior holding in Cutter v. Wilkinson that ‘[c]ontext matters’ in the application of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA).”117 Her opinion itself relies on Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in
Cutter, which similarly notes the importance of a contextual approach,
involving the concerns of both parties, in reading of a RLUIPA claim:
“While the Act adopts a ‘compelling governmental interest’ standard . . .
‘[c]ontext matters’ in the application of that standard.”118
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Second, in Lynch and County of Allegheny, Justice O’Connor has also
demanded that the constitutionality of a government religious display be
judged through an exercise of compassionate understanding of how these
displays’ messages affect the political self-understanding of the most
vulnerable of citizens. For “[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.”119
Justice O’Connor has followed this theme in her few Free Exercise
opinions as well. In her Smith concurrence, she twice calls out the
importance of a compassionate review by the Court and the state about how
the government’s laws affect minorities.120 Once again, she echoes the
theme that this review must be highly contextual with respect to the
individual believer’s situation-the Court must
apply this test in each case to determine whether the burden on the
specific plaintiffs before us is constitutionally significant and whether
the particular criminal interest asserted by the State before us is
compelling. Even if, as an empirical matter, a government’s criminal
laws might usually serve a compelling interest in health, safety, or
public order, the First Amendment at least requires a case-by-case
determination of the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular
claim.121
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119
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); County of
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 573, 625 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
120
Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 (1990) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
121
Id. at 899 (emphases added). In her interesting dissent in Hernandez v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 710–11 (1989), Justice O’Connor employed the same technique used
by Justice Kagan in Town of Greece to demand that the Court, and the reader, put themselves in the
shoes of a Scientologist: “Neither has [the IRS] explained why the benefit received by a Christian who
obtains the pew of his or her choice by paying a rental fee, a Jew who gains entrance to High Holy Day
services by purchasing a ticket, a Mormon who makes the fixed payment necessary for a temple
recommend, or a Catholic who pays a Mass stipend, is incidental to the real benefit conferred on the
‘general public and members of the faith,’ . . . while the benefit received by a Scientologist from
auditing is a personal accommodation” which is not tax deductible.
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Moreover, Justice O’Connor argues that the state must both see and
respect the non-political harm it has caused to particular believers in Free
Exercise cases, even in those cases where it must reluctantly decide to apply
the law anyway. As she puts it in Smith, “the essence of a free exercise
claim is relief from a burden imposed by government on religious practices
or beliefs . . . laws that, in effect, make abandonment of one’s own religion
or conformity to the religious beliefs of others the price of an equal place in
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122
Smith, 494 U.S. at 897 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), in which a Native American father objected to the possible spirit-destroying
attachment of a Social Security number to his daughter’s record, Justice O’Connor opined, “[o]nly an
especially important governmental interest pursued by narrowly tailored means can justify exacting a
sacrifice of First Amendment freedoms as the price for an equal share of the rights, benefits, and
privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” Id. at 728 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In this case, Justice O’Connor’s skepticism about a Smith-type law of neutral applicability rule is
similarly grounded in the importance of looking contextually at the precise burden or conflict of
loyalties imposed upon a religious minority citizen.
123
Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
124
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 721 (2005).
125
Id. at 720 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
705 (1994)).
126
Id.
127
Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Yellowbear
v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 59 (10th Cir. 2014)).
128
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
594–595 (1940)).
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the civil community.”122 She moreover notes the “harsh impact majoritarian
rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious groups such as the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Amish.”123 Justice Ginsburg strikes a similar
chord in interpreting RLUIPA in the Cutter case, noting how the law
“protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their
religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s permission
and accommodation for exercise of their religion.”124
This demand for the government to really see the religious dissenter
and care what the law is doing to her is described in other ways in the
female Justices’ opinions. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor similarly reject
the right of the government to turn a blind eye to the harms it causes when
it requires religious dissenters to conform to secular law. In Cutter, for
example, Justice Ginsburg notes that “government need not ‘be oblivious to
impositions that legitimate exercises of state power may place on religious
belief and practice.’”125 Rather, under RLUIPA, “courts must take adequate
account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on
nonbeneficiaries.”126 Similarly, in Hobbs, Justice Sotomayor notes that
judicial deference to prison administrators’ experience “does not extend so
far that prison officials may declare a compelling governmental interest by
fiat.”127
The rhetoric of the Smith majority opinion clearly favors the argument
that religion is an individualistic preference and that the religious dissenter
is eccentric and subversive, echoing the Court’s opinions in cases like
Prince and Barnette. These dissenting beliefs, Justice Scalia argues, citing
Justice Frankfurter in Gobitis, “contradict the relevant concerns of a
political society” and thus do “not relieve the citizen from the discharge of
political responsibilities.”128 Permitting religious exemptions unless there is
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Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–167 (1878)).
Id at 886. Certainly, there is other language in this opinion which contradicts the
individualistic understanding of religious dissent. For example, Justice Scalia quotes Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1963), noting that uniform application of general laws to religious dissenters
is important “[p]recisely because ‘we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every
conceivable religious preference,’ . . . and precisely because we value and protect that religious
divergence.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. Similarly, Justice Scalia grudgingly accepts that there is a cost to
religious dissenters, albeit in his view an acceptable cost: “Accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each
conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the
centrality of all religious beliefs.” Id. at 890.
131
Id. at 901 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
132
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 555 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
133
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 891 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
130
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a compelling state interest, he argues, would permit a religious believer “to
become a law unto himself,”129 and to “ignore generally applicable laws.”130
The possibility that the believer is making a conscientious choice out of a
relationship with God and other persons does not seem within the realm of
Justice Scalia’s imagination about religious dissent.
Rather than suggesting that religious liberty is principally for the
eccentric, the women Justices call for respect for the role of religion in the
life of believers and the community. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Smith insists that “an individual’s free exercise of religion is a preferred
constitutional activity,” not an anomaly.131 In City of Boerne, she
underscores this point historically by discussing at length Madison’s
concern that early drafts of the Free Exercise Clause using the term
“toleration” wrongly suggested that “the right to practice one’s religion was
a governmental favor, rather than an inalienable liberty.”132
These women Justices also understand the importance of religious
dissenters’ ability to be faithful and constant to the relationships in their
lives. In Justice O’Connor’s argument for a robust Free Exercise regime in
Smith, she honors the virtue of integrity by asking that the state not insist
that religious believers abandon their commitments to each other and to
their God as a price of honoring their citizenship commitments to their
neighbors and the authorities.133 The standard test that the Smith Court
propounds refuses to consider the terrible bind in which a uniform law with
no exceptions or contextualization places the citizen who wants to be
faithful to both God and country.
The Free Exercise cases where women are plaintiffs are but a subset of
these cases—all Lillian Gobitis, Lucie McClure, Frieda Yoder and the rest
are asking is that they be allowed to meet commitments to both sets of
relationships. By contrast to the Smith ruling, in her lengthy historical
dissent in City of Boerne calling for a review of the Smith decision, Justice
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O’Connor notes that the very exemptions sought by believers such as Adell
Sherbert and Lillian Gobitis were historically granted to religious
dissenters, whether it was the requirement that they take an oath, or an
exemption from military conscription.134 Despite the high public cost, she
notes, the Founders recognized the importance of respecting religious
conscience.135 Moreover, she cites with approval not simply an individualist
argument for Free Exercise, but Madison’s own relational argument that
tracks the religious concerns of gratitude and humility:
This right is . . . unalienable; [both] because the opinions of [people] . . . cannot follow the dictates of other[s] . . . [and it entails] a duty
towards the Creator. This duty is precedent both in order of time and
degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society. [E]very man who
becomes a member of any particular Civil Society, [must] do it with a
saving of his allegiance to the Universal Sovereign.136
To Madison, then, duties to God were superior to duties to civil authorities—the ultimate loyalty was owed to God above all.
The importance of integrity in the relationship of the religious believer
with the world is evidenced as much in Justice O’Connor’s opinions
upholding the state’s regulation as those where she would overturn it. In
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, for example, she contrasts the imposition of a
sales tax on a large religious corporation’s income with previous license
taxes imposed by municipalities on evangelizers seeking donations:

Thus, Justice O’Connor makes the very argument that Sarah Prince made:
the street is my church, and the people to whom I provide tracts for a
donation are those I am called to serve.
At the same time, we continue to see the women Justices’ recognition
that there is room for compromise between the state and the believer, that
Flores, 521 U.S. at 534 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 539.
136
Id. (quoting 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 184–85 (G. Hunt ed.1901)).
137
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 385 (1990) (quoting
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1943)).
135
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The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of
missionary evangelism . . . utilized today on a large scale by various
religious sects whose colporteurs carry the Gospel to thousands upon
thousands of homes and seek through personal visitations to win
adherents to their faith. It is more than preaching; it is more than
distribution of religious literature. It is a combination of both. Its
purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting. This form of religious
activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as
do worship in the churches and preaching in the pulpits.137
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the right to religious dissent is not an absolute right. In Cutter, Justice
Ginsburg cites the compromise-laden “room for play in the joints”
phrase.138 In Holt, Justice Sotomayor emphasizes that the right to protection
for religious exercise must be judged as “relative” and does not impose an
impossible burden on the state to “refute every conceivable option to satisfy
RLUIPA’s least restrictive means requirement” or “prove that they
considered less restrictive alternatives at a particular point in time.”139
Justice Ginsburg similarly argues in Cutter, “[w]e have no cause to believe
that RLUIPA would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way, with
particular sensitivity to security concerns.”140
IV. TOWARD A RELIGIOUS FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

139
140
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In light of the themes we see being expressed by the women Justices
on the Court on Religion Clause issues, we might take some tentative steps
toward what rule of law for Free Exercise jurisprudence a religious feminist
might propose. It should be one that accounts for the feminist focus on
contextuality and relationality, as well as reflecting the particular human
values that religious feminists would highlight: those of gratitude, humility,
compassion, generosity, and integrity. To make an easy start, such a
principle would no doubt look a lot more like the Sherbert test than the
Smith rule, but we might ask whether it is possible to articulate something
more specific than Sherbert yields.
First, like the practice of women justices that we have been discussing,
such a rule would eschew automatic judicial deference to uniform rules of
law, whether they are legislative or judge-made. Instead, judges would take
an active role in probing the concrete context in which a religious believer
asserted a Free Exercise claim. Such a first step does not mean there would
be no deference to legislators or administrators. For example, it may be
clear from the legislative history or even the language of a statute or
regulation that the legislature or executive has carefully considered just
such a case as the religious dissenter has filed. When a legislature has
respectfully considered the harm posed to religious believers by a uniform
rule and expressly concluded, with findings of fact, that the harm to others
in the state clearly outweighs the harm to religious believers, a court may
defer to those findings of fact and conclusions if they are consistent with the
evidence before the court. The rhetoric and practice of judicial deference in
these circumstances would reflect not the rigid claims of jurisdictional

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 867, 868 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.

C M
Y K

37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 41 Side A

04/28/2016 10:11:02

05 - FAILINGER_FINAL_4.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

Women and the Free Exercise Clause

4/25/16 9:24 PM

75

incompetence of the judiciary,141 but active engagement with the
circumstances coupled with the judicial humility that sounds in rhetoric of
self-restraint.
Second, such a rule would assume that religious plaintiffs have a right
to be fully heard on their claim of conscience, as a matter of showing
respect for their situation and their particular dilemmas. The values of
compassion and generosity require no less. If such a hearing took the form
of a traditional trial before a judge, a feminist reading of the Free Exercise
Clause would suggest that the courts be reasonably generous in permitting
religious litigants to introduce evidence about the nature of their religious
belief and why the legal compulsion they are resisting would cause a true
conflict of conscience.
The courts have been somewhat uneven in granting religious litigants a
full hearing. On one hand, in the Central American sanctuary cases and in
civil disobedience cases protesting nuclear or foreign policy, some courts
have been rigid in blocking introduction of evidence regarding plaintiff’s
religious beliefs.142 On the other, many of the Supreme Court Free Exercise
cases have involved fairly robust presentations of evidence about religious
beliefs that force a crisis of conscience when believers are being coerced to
act against conscience. As just two examples of the latter, the Court allowed
significant evidence about Amish religious beliefs and historical interaction
with the outside world in Wisconsin v. Yoder143 and in Lyng v. Northwest
Cemetery Association,144 a similarly fulsome presentation of evidence about
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141
Scholars have made a good case for a jurisdictional reading of the Religion Clauses,
including an argument about its compatibility with theological claims that may have motivated the
drafters. See, e.g., IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE
(2014). The jurisdictional approach brings a commendable level of certainty to the problem of who has
authority to make decisions about religious exercise. However, its drawback is precisely that rigidity and
clarity, which may not respect unique contextual factors that call for a better balance of judicial inquiry
and self-restraint.
142
See, e.g., Barbara Bezdek, Religious Outlaws: Narratives of Legality and the Politics of
Citizen Interpretation, 62 TENN. L. REV. 899, 952–62 (1995) (discussing recalcitrance of judges to
permit Sanctuary movement defendants to introduce evidence about their religious reasons for sheltering
Central American refugees); William P. Quigley, The Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases:
Bring in the Jury, 38 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 3, 33–34, 54–55, 65 (2003) (comparing cases in which the
jury was allowed to hear religious claims of defendants arguing necessity in nuclear weapon cases and
Sanctuary and other cases where the courts refused such testimony); Felton Davis, Civil Disobedience
and the Law, WARISACRIME.ORG (Mar. 2013), warisacrime.org/sites/afterdowningstreet.org/files/
cdandlaw.pdf (describing civil disobedience cases such as United States v. Eberhardt, 417 F.2d 1009
(4th Cir. 1969), in which defendants were permitted to introduce some evidence regarding their religious
beliefs, as well as cases such as United States v. Montgomery (the “Pershing Plowshares” case), 772
F.2d 733 (11th Cir. 1985), in which prosecutors successfully excluded evidence regarding religious
beliefs and defenses such as necessity).
143
For a summary of this evidence, see Brief for the Peititoner at 15–17, Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) (No. 70–110), 1971 WL 126407, at *15–17.
144
For a summary of these claims, see Brief for the Petitioners at 2–14, Lyng v. Northwest
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Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (No. 86-1013), 987 WL 880342, at *2–14.
145
Richmond News v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (quoting State v. Schmit, N.W.2d
800, 807 (Minn. 1966)) (noting “[i]t is not unrealistic even in this day to believe that public inclusion
affords citizens a form of legal education and hopefully promotes confidence in the fair administration
of justice”); State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800, 807 (Minn. 1966).
146
See Marie A. Failinger, United States v. Ballard, in LAW AND RELIGION CASES IN CONTEXT
41–42 (Aspen Press, Leslie Griffin ed., 2010).
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Native American beliefs about sacred lands.
One objection to the introduction of religious evidence in Free
Exercise cases may be that trials will drag on, creating an inefficient use of
court resources, and records will become riddled with irrelevant evidence.
However, such evidence certainly is not irrelevant to one of the consistent
questions that the courts ask in Free Exercise cases—i.e., whether the
defendant sincerely identifies a conflict between his religious beliefs and
the state’s demands. Moreover, to the extent that a Free Exercise case has
the value of illuminating minority religions’ difficulties with majoritarian
laws that unwittingly or thoughtlessly impose severe constraints on
minority religionists, a trial record can serve as public education about the
nature of these conflicts, which is one of the values of public trials
themselves.145 Moreover, good trial judges can manage requests to
introduce evidence in ways that permit both fulsome and efficient creation
of a record, putting pressure on litigants to eliminate redundancy and to
sharpen their central religious claims and the evidence supporting them.
Beyond efficiency and relevance concerns, there may be some concern
that permitting religious litigants to introduce religious evidence risks the
possibility that judges will make religious judgments—e.g., that a defendant
is not sincere because his version of his religion does not square with
others’ version of what his religion requires, or that one sect or school of a
particular religion represents the “true” theology in such a religion.146 While
such a concern is valid, it is not inevitably true that presentation of religious
evidence results in impermissible theological fact-finding by courts. That a
court agrees to hear religious claims as a matter of compassion and
generosity does not automatically require a court to pass on the objective
validity or centrality of such claims.
Third, the Court needs to re-interpret or perhaps re-invent the language
of “compelling” in the compelling state interest test if that is the starting
point for a feminist-inspired reading of the Free Exercise Clause. As it has
been interpreted in the Free Exercise cases, the term “compelling” has been
given a range of interpretations from “subordinating” i.e., more important
than the interest of the plaintiffs when those interest are balanced, to “of
overriding importance” (also a comparative term, but suggesting an interest
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of great concern to the state).147
As just one example, courts hearing free exercise claims have found
non-compelling the state’s claimed interests “to avoid the widespread
unemployment and the consequent burden on the fund resulting if people
were permitted to leave jobs for ‘personal’ reasons; and to avoid a detailed
probing by employers into job applicants’ religious beliefs,”148 while
finding compelling a “public interest in maintaining a sound tax system,”
free of “myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious
beliefs.”149
Closer attention to the word itself, “compelling” may hold a key. It
differs from other descriptors used to describe important state interests,
such as “weighty” or “substantial”150 in that it is a rhetorical rather than a
metaphysical descriptor. It does not require the Court to create a priority list
for the legislature about which interests—for example, national security or
violence—should carry more weight than other interests—for example,
administrative convenience. Rather, to “compel” in this circumstance means
to convince a decision-maker that the state has made its case for the refusal
to waive the applicability of the law to a particular Free Exercise case.
Thus, the term need not imply that the test is almost always “fatal in fact”151
because it requires an impossibly weighty interest of the state. Rather, in
reality, the Court’s actions have resembled the descriptions of strict scrutiny
as a “balancing” test between the individual’s and the state’s interests,152
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147
Lukumi Babalu Aye suggests that compelling also means comprehensive, noting that if the
government “fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or
alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling. It is
established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that ‘a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest
“‘of the highest order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest
unprohibited.’” Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993).
148
Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981).
149
Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 700 (1981).
150
See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd.
of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))
(describing the compelling state interest in remedying past or present racial discrimination as “a
sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed affirmative
action program”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003) (noting that the University’s
compelling interest in educational diversity as implemented by “its critical mass idea, which creates
‘substantial’ educational benefits”).
151
See Justice O’Connor’s similar point in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,
237 (1995).
152
See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 569 (1993) (Souter, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (discussing the Court’s precedents that were “illustrative of the general
nature of free-exercise protections and the delicate balancing required by our decisions in
[Sherbert and Yoder] when an important state interest is shown”). Indeed, in Burwell, the Court
suggested that, “RFRA did more than merely restore the balancing test used in the Sherbert line of cases;
it provided even broader protection for religious liberty than was available under those decisions.”
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 n.3 (2014).
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See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 719 (citing the lack of evidence to support the state’s interest).
Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (in which Justice
Scalia’s remark excoriating a Free Exercise regime that would permit an individual to become “a law
unto himself” essentially equates conscience claims with refusals to obey the law for idiosyncratic
personal reasons).
155
See Marie A. Failinger, “No More Deaths”: On Conscience, Civil Disobedience, and a New
Role for Truth Commissions, 75 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 401, 421–25 (2007) (describing medieval Catholic
and Lutheran views of the operation of the conscience).
156
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208 (1972) (describing history of Amish
religion and reasons for refusal to attend school); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 439–40 (1971)
(describing conscientious objection based on centuries of Catholic just war theory); Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503. 510 nn.1, 2 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing Goldman’s request
to wear yarmulke based on Orthodox Jewish custom and belief); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 459–62 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing longstanding
154
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one that that initially puts the thumb on the scales of the religious
individual; or those that suggest that the state is being put to its proof that it
has deeply considered and studied how it will effectuate its interests.153
However, if we must think of the compelling state interest test as a
balance—and the question of whether the state’s interest “overrides” the
plaintiff’s, or vice-versa—that balance can only be properly calculated if
the nature of the plaintiff’s interest is adequately accounted for. This is
particularly true in cases where the plaintiff is being required to violate her
conscience and invade the integrity of her relationships with other persons
and communities of which she is a part. Those cases such as Smith that
imply that claims of conscience are personal predilections154 miss the mark,
because they do not rest on adequate scholarly accounts of the way in which
conscience is formed and how it is different from merely personal
preference.155
Thus, taking the time to listen to a plaintiff describe the trajectory of
religious experience which has led her to the conclusion that, like Sarah
Prince, she must obey God rather than men and according that belief full
respect is critical to this endeavor. The value of compassion suggests that
both government and the courts that hear religious exemption cases must be
well enough acquainted with the dilemma facing religious objectors that
they can grasp, at least in its essence, what is at stake in the minds of such
believers.
At the same time, in conditions of sin, both governments and the
courts who hear these cases need to be prepared, if absolutely necessary, to
interrogate religious believers about whether their “sincere religious belief”
is a matter of personal whim or darker personal motivations such as racism
or homophobia. Most religious dissenters who have succeeded in their
claims (and many who have not) can describe in detail an honest and
reasoned position from within the religious or spiritual tradition which they
claim has called them to disobey the secular law.156 They are not relying on
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Native religious beliefs about sacred lands).
157
Failinger, United States v. Ballard, supra note 146, at 42–43.
158
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714.
159
See Smith, 494 U.S. at 902.
160
See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
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a “gut hunch” or an emotional reaction to the state’s law to justify their
claims.
We must be candid about the risks here: such an interrogation risks the
specter of judges making improper theological conclusions about the
validity of dissenters’ claims, and possibly judging some claims as not
religious or spiritual because believers cannot point to a long-standing,
well-documented tradition of religious thought to support their positions.
Justice Jackson, speaking in Ballard, correctly warned of the possibility that
judges’ and juries’ unwillingness to accept the objective truth of a religious
claimant’s statement will color their assessment of whether that claimant is
sincere in his belief or an imposter.157 And, the Court in Thomas v. Review
Board reminds that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment
protection.”158
Nevertheless, reserving the possibility of such a test in the most
extreme cases where the religious claimant cannot articulate any basis for
his or her belief may be necessary to avoid Justice Scalia’s “parade of
horribles” suggesting that religious belief may be used as a cloak to hide
behind anarchic and idiosyncratic exercises that “thumb their nose” at the
authority of the state.159 However, employing the value of integrity as
constancy in one’s own character and constancy to others, courts can look
for a course of past action in the religious dissenter as someone who has
taken responsibility for her actions and her future in relationship to others in
the community.160
A constitutional focus on a “compelling” interest also implies,
consistent with the values of humility and compassion, that the government
present actual evidence about its conclusion that a uniform rule is so
significant that it must be applied to plaintiffs in order to effectuate the
offered state interest. Humility as a value requires that one be prepared to
acknowledge one’s own limitations. For the state, one of those limitations
in promulgating laws is limited information about how such laws will affect
its constituencies, both now and in the future. A government that has acted
on the basis of limited and thus flawed knowledge about the nature of the
burdens that its citizens carry should be prepared to correct mistakes it may
have made based on faulty and incomplete information.
Conversely, a government that has overstated the interest it has in
regulating citizens generally should be prepared to acknowledge that it has
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161
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 821–22 (2000) (dissecting
paucity of evidence for a restriction on adult-oriented TV); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–71
(1993) (dissecting inadequate evidence of effectuation of the state’s interest even in a commercial
speech case); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 667 (1993) (dissecting the inadequate evidence
and inferences in a commercial speech case).
162
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 779 (1995).
163
Id. at 780.
164
Id.
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overreached, and that it need not have regulated in some subset, or perhaps
most subsets, of cases governed by its reach. We might look to some of the
Court’s Speech Clause cases to set a properly high standard for courts in
putting the state to its proof that its laws reflect a well-researched and wellreasoned and focused, i.e., narrowly tailored, approach to the evils they are
attempting to eradicate.161 The Free Exercise Clause demands no less.
To avoid Justice Jackson’s concern that judges and juries might
discount a plaintiff’s sincerity because of their disbelief about her claims,
the value of compassion suggests that the decision-maker be trained to be
capable of walking in the shoes of the religious plaintiff, at least minimally.
The value of compassion requires that any government decision-maker seek
to understand at a very basic level why a religious plaintiff would consider
the duties of her faith to so gravely implicate her salvation or her intrinsic
moral integrity that she would be willing to violate the secular law and face
the consequences before giving that up. Again, we might call upon Justice
O’Connor’s Religion Clause cases to articulate what the nature of the
compelling state interest test might mean in religious test cases. She has
suggested that a judge may and must make a judgment about whether the
state has trenched upon Establishment Clause concerns using a “collective
standard to gauge ‘the “objective” meaning of the [government’s] statement
in the community.’”162 Thus, the judge must be the “personification of a
community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collective]
social judgment.”163 The “reasonable observer . . . must be deemed aware of
the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious
display appears.”164 This call would seem to implicate the need for the
decision-maker to have a basic understanding of the religious plurality of
his or her community coupled with the curiosity and willingness to learn
more from litigants about their traditions.
The value of humility suggests that courts should be more prepared to
constitutionally “bless” regulatory schemes potentially trenching on Free
Exercise rights if they contain procedures for seeking waivers or
exemptions when a law is inaptly applied to religious believers. Recall how
Justice Scalia characterized the unemployment benefits process as
anomalous for First Amendment law because it permits religious believers,
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like others, to bring evidence and receive individualized determinations that
the “seeking work” or “good cause” termination rules of those systems were
not justly applied to them.165
Instead of considering the unemployment cases as aberrant exceptions
and cases like Smith with its uniform and apparently unconsidered law
treating all drugs in all settings the same as the norm, the Court should be
holding up laws that have exemption processes as desirable examples of
how constitutional laws should be written. Similarly, states that adopt
general religious exemption laws166 that permit courts to consider contextdriven exemptions from all or some large subset of state statutes should be
praised, not condemned, for carving out the opportunity for religious
believers to present a valid defense. The recent rash of attacks on “littleRFRA” statutes being introduced in state legislatures in the wake of the rise
of same-sex marriage167 has perhaps made for good political theater about
important equality values, but the demise of these statutes in the wake of
these isolated controversies makes for bad constitutional law. Waiver and
exemption statutes do not certainly spell the end to non-discrimination or
other important laws; they simply give religious dissenters the opportunity
to make a case for why the laws should not be applied to them, a case which
needs to be more fulsome and compelling than “it just seems wrong to me.”
Crafting these statutes, however, may require more than simply
mimicking Sherbert v. Verner. Such statutes, without at least specific
direction to administrative bodies about how to implement them,168 risk the
165
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See Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
For a listing of the twenty-three current state “little-RFRA” laws, see, State Religious
Freedom Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, www.ncsl.org/research/civil-andcriminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2015), and for the current status of 2015
legislation, see State Religious Freedom Restoration Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS, www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/2015-state-rfra-legislation.aspx (last
visited Sept. 7, 2015).
167
See, e.g., Tony Cook, Tom LoBianco & Doug Stanglin, Indiana Governor Signs Amended
“Religious Freedom” Law, USA TODAY (Apr. 2, 2015, 6:50 pm), www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2015/04/02/indiana-religious-freedom-law-deal-gay-discrimination/70819106. The case of
Indiana’s little-RFRA illustrates how lack of contextual attention to all of the public interests involved
and the resulting lack of careful tailoring can leave room for questions about whether religious
dissenters are entitled to engage in actions that violate the human rights of others. As a result of the
public controversy surrounding its law, controversy that probably would not have erupted but for a
national basketball tournament, Indiana amended its RFRA to exclude refusals to provide services or
goods to the public based on sexual orientation or a number of other disadvantaged groups.
168
For various examples of state statutory religious freedom exemptions, see Daniel O. Conkle,
Free Exercise, Federalism and the States as Laboratories, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 493, 496–98 (1999).
Professor Conkle describes several alternatives. For example, a legislative study committee or
administrative regulations might craft “specifically defined religious exemptions for particular legal
contexts.” A state “might provide a more lenient standard of scrutiny in certain contexts, such as
prisons,” or a law might define “more precisely what constitutes a prima facie claim for relief,” by
defining substantial burden and exercise of religion. A state might be more specific about what a
166
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“compelling” interest is (i.e., prevention of direct harms to specific parties or to public health, safety,
etc.), or when the state has offered a “least restrictive means” to further it. A state might craft a law that
provides different standards of scrutiny for “core” religious acts such as worship or religious rituals, and
another standard for conscientious objection to laws. Eugene Volokh has suggested a different approach:
permitting courts to use the tradition of religious freedom jurisprudence in the United States to make a
“common law” of religious exemptions coupled with specific legislative and executive agency
exemptions instantiated in law, with the burden of justification on the government if there is no evidence
of a legislative exemption from the religious freedom law, Eugene Volokh, A Common Law Model for
Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1503–04 (1999).
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same a-contextual approach insensitive to the needs of those who may
suffer harm because of a religious exemption that a blanket “neutral,
generally applicable” statute risks to these believers.
Finally, the value of humility expects the state to have considered
alternatives in light of the possible harm to be caused to its religious
citizens by the law. Again, the Court has been unclear exactly what the
terms “narrowly tailored” or “least restrictive alternative” mean in the
context of protecting religious expression. In recent years, the Court claims
to have moved from an extreme understanding of these terms, i.e., holding
the state must design the most narrow statute humanly conceivable. Instead,
it has tended to invalidate only those statutes that are breathtakingly
overbroad and do not significantly advance the state’s purported interest.
Yet, neither a “substantial overbreadth” nor an “absolutely no
alternatives” definition of narrow tailoring appropriately applies to religious
freedom cases. A religious adherent who is forced to violate her conscience
is not comforted by the fact that a law is narrowly designed to regulate only
a small class of people, including her. Nor does her problem go away if the
state can show that it chose an alternative which least restricts the most
freedom, if it still violates her conscience. Rather, the Court’s formulation
that a restriction of her religion must be really “necessary” in order to
achieve the state’s important and convincing interest properly respects the
delicate balance between freedom of conscience and the state’s need to use
law as a means to serve the community.
Thus, if we had to formulate a religious feminist reading of the Free
Exercise Clause into a usable principle of law, it might read something like
this: When the court faces a religious plaintiff who sincerely believes that
her faith requires her to violate the law, the court must be convinced that,
given the history and context of the plaintiff’s belief and the state’s
promulgation of the law, the state has either (a) provided for a robust
process for exempting a plaintiff from enforcement of the law, one which
allows her to make a full case for her religious objection before a wellinformed and neutral decision maker, such as an administrative law judge;
or (b) fully considered and documented, in its legislative history, that
application of the law to the plaintiff and those like her is necessary in order
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to effectuate its state interest; or (c) shown the court, by clear and
compelling evidence, that it is necessary to regulate religious believers
whose exercise is substantially burdened to achieve the state’s interest, and
that the state’s interest is compelling enough to override the plaintiff’s
exercise of her religious beliefs, given the full context of the state’s
application of its law to individual plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
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169
See, e.g., James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions43.
html (noting that “[w]hilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the
Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose
minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. If this freedom be abused, it is an
offence against God, not against man: To God, therefore, not to man, must an account of it be rendered”
and closing with the prayer that “the Supreme Lawgiver of the Universe, by illuminating those to whom
it is addressed, may on the one hand, turn their Councils from every act which would affront his holy
prerogative, or violate the trust committed to them: and on the other, guide them into every measure
which may be worthy of his blessing, may redound to their own praise, and may establish more firmly
the liberties, the prosperity and the happiness of the Commonwealth.”). See the Preamble to the 1870
Constitution of the State of Illinois, ILL. CONST. pmbl., beginning “We, the People of the State of
Illinois—grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political and religious liberty which He has permitted us
to enjoy and seeking His blessing upon our endeavors . . . ” and other state constitution preambles. See
State Preambles, E REFERENCE DESK, www.ereferencedesk.com/resources/state-preambles (last visited
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As we have seen, it is possible to hear, albeit dimly, “a woman’s
voice” in the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence, both in the
actions of women litigants in these cases, and more clearly, the language
that the women justices use to articulate how the Free Exercise Clause
should be interpreted. These litigants’ actions and these justices’ opinions
call for a careful evaluation of the context in which religious freedom
conflicts arise by a decision-maker who is well-versed in the history of his
or her community, including its religious diversity. The women justices also
call for a respectful hearing of the stories of religious dissenters, one that, if
not fully empathetic, at least attempts to “walk a mile” in the shoes of such
believers in an attempt to understand why they feel obliged to refuse the
state obedience to particular laws. A feminist reading of the Free Exercise
Clause thus emphasizes the importance of a fully contextual and relational
perspective on religious freedom conflicts.
As these arguments of the justices suggest, in a religious feminist
reading, the Constitution calls legislatures, executives and courts to respond
to the reality of religious minorities in their midst by exercising those
virtues the Constitution should embody. The Free Exercise Clause should
be read to effectuate the vision of those Founders who understood religious
liberty as a blessing, and were willing to protect the liberty of all, religious
and secular, in gratitude for that blessing. 169
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By asking the state to consider the plight of religious minorities, these
justices essentially ask for the law to demonstrate compassion and
generosity to religious groups and individuals who are powerless to effect
majoritarian protection on their own. Such virtues require that government
respect these minorities by giving careful attention to the stories of religious
dissenters. They also call for serious and concrete self-reflection, borne out
of the virtue of humility, on whether the state has truly considered the plight
of religious minorities in its decision-making process, according their
dilemmas of conscience value equal to those accorded majority believers.
When that consideration has not been a significant part of the legislative
process, the value of humility also requires the state to re-consider whether
believers’ requests for an exemption from generally applicable laws due to
conflicts of conscience may be granted without serious damage to the
state’s interests. While there are no shortcuts to handle assertions of
religious freedom claims, the Constitution and the experiment in religious
liberty that it has fostered require no less.
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